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Abstract 
 
The US department store industry has undergone a recent round of strategic acquisition-based portfolio 
restructuring.  This paper analyses one such acquisition, studying how its geography is restructured in the pre-
merger stage to conform to the Federal Trade Commission's 'fix-it-first' policy and to improve the strategic fit of 
the transaction.  The article then investigates evidence, and analyses the effects, of a new era of stricter FTC 
enforcement, where divestiture may no longer be sufficient in cases of horizontal market overlap.  
Fundamentally, the paper considers the nature of 'real' regulation in action, as rules partially dictate investment 
decisions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
There are numerous forms of corporate restructuring a firm may adopt in order to succeed in competitive 
markets.  These have been well documented within the economic geography literature (e.g. Clark, 1993b; 1994; 
Clark et al., 1992; McGrath-Champ, 1999).  First, an organisation may pursue financial restructuring; changing 
the capital structure of the firm to increase shareholder value.  High leverage restructurings (LBOs and 
leveraged recapitalisations) in particular, have met with varied levels of success across different industries and 
firms (Bowman et al., 1999).  Second, a firm may restructure organisationally, redesigning its operations to 
align with the firm’s strategy (cf. Porter, 1980).  Finally, and most obviously, a firm may restructure its portfolio 
of business units to sharpen its focus by disposing of units peripheral to its broader goals and core operations, 
eliminating under-performing units, or alternatively acquiring other operations and integrating either 
horizontally or vertically (see Bowman et al., 1999; Bowman and Singh, 1993; Green, 1990).  It is this latter 
form of restructuring which provides the focus of this paper. 
 
Portfolio restructuring clearly does not operate within a regulatory vacuum.  In the United States it takes place 
within the context of antitrust legislation and its enforcement (see Wrigley, 1992 for a review of antitrust 
regulation in the retail industry).  This paper uses the example of the US department store industry in the 1990s 
to explore issues of portfolio restructuring operating in a regulatory constrained environment, considering in 
particular how difficulties with managing spatial strategic fit are negotiated through interaction with competitors 
in local markets58.  This geographical analysis of portfolio restructuring, interacting with governance and 
competition policy, provides an example of what Gordon Clark (1992a) has labelled ‘real’ regulation.  In 
addition, it provides a perspective on the implementation of US antitrust legislation, and the implications of 
reinterpretations of antitrust regulation for future merger and acquisition activity within the US retail industry. 
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 This research is based in part on two extensive periods of US fieldwork during January and March/April 
2000, consisting of over 30 interviews with leading industry executives at department store retailers including 
Bloomingdale’s, Saks Incorporated, and Macy’s, academics, and equity analysts at Goldman Sachs, Merrill 
Lynch and Schroders.  This material was triangulated with industry reports, press releases and the retail press.  
Interview quotations are numbered to protect the anonymity of respondents where this was requested. 
 
  
 
FORMS OF PORTFOLIO RESTRUCTURING 
 
There are a number of situations where a firm may choose to adopt a strategy of portfolio restructuring.  First, it 
may adopt an aggressive acquisition policy of related businesses, purchasing similar firms in order to increase 
market dominance and economies of scale.  Bergh (1997) identifies three principal benefits of such a 
transaction.  First, there may be the prospect of synergies, both operational and financial.  Second, governance 
efficiencies may result where the acquired businesses may be more efficiently managed in the parent firm’s 
governance system.  As Hill et al. (1992) suggest, the acquirer may be ‘able to achieve a more efficient 
allocation of capital resources between divisions, and police the efficiency of divisions more effectively than the 
stock market could were each division an independent firm’ (p503).  Third, managerialism benefits may result 
whereby the corporation achieves market power and increases in organisational size as a result of the 
acquisition. 
 
Alternatively, the firm may adopt an acquisition policy of related businesses as a defensive strategy - possibly 
leveraging up to fend off potential acquirers (Laulajainen, 1990).  In a market where there are few acquisition 
targets, the firm may be prepared to pay a premium for any remaining candidates (Wrigley, 1999b).  This 
premium may be worth paying if the acquisition improves the firm’s position in the market and prevents a 
competitor from pre-empting it. 
 
Third, portfolio restructuring may entail disposing of units peripheral to its core business.  Such divestiture 
might be to raise capital for other acquisitions or to rid itself of under-performing divisions, although they are 
likely to incur what Clark and Wrigley (1995; 1997) refer to as ‘exit sunk costs’.  This would have the effect of 
sharpening focus, but at the expense of increasing dependence on the core operation.   
 
Finally, the firm may diversify its portfolio through the purchase of units not related to its core business.  This is 
likely to act as coinsurance for the acquirer, enabling the balancing of revenue cyclicalities, substantially 
reducing risk (Bergh, 1997).  Such a defensive manoeuvre may shift emphasis away from a faltering core 
operation, allowing entry to a growth industry, or alternatively, be a strategy to increase revenue to fund the core 
operation (Chung and Weston, 1982; Gort, 1966; Hughes et al., 1980).  However, unrelatedness often represents 
a barrier to realising operational and financial synergies, and as such, ‘a high proportion of unrelated 
acquisitions are divested shortly after purchase’ (Bergh, 1997, p726). 
 
PORTFOLIO RESTRUCTURING AND THE US DEPARTMENT STORE INDUSTRY 
 
All of these methods of portfolio restructuring have been characteristic of the US department store industry over 
the last few turbulent decades.  During the 1960s and 1970s, with the impression that the future of the 
conventional department store looked bleak, department stores adopted strategies of portfolio diversification, 
acquiring businesses from other sectors, including discounters, supermarkets and speciality stores (Bluestone et 
al., 1981; Laulajainen, 1987; 1988; Traub, 1994).  The industry, in this respect, was characteristic of the so-
called conglomerate merger wave of the period (Clark, 1992b; Fligstein, 1990; Schendel, 1993).   
 
During the mid to late 1980s the department store industry underwent a period of portfolio restructuring 
principally driven by financial restructuring imperatives.  This portfolio restructuring was principally motivated 
by opportunities for individuals and firms to acquire retailers with little equity through significant changes in the 
capital structure of the target.  The US department store industry was one of the most notable casualties of the 
over-leveraging and debt-burdening characteristic of ‘junk’ bond financing.  Firstly, between 1986 and 1988, 
Federated, and Allied, two of the largest department stores, were acquired by Canadian real estate virtuoso, 
Robert Campeau in a highly leveraged acquisition, underpinned by money from the coffers of Citibank and First 
Boston (see Hallsworth, 1991; Kaplin, 1990, 1994; Rothchild, 1991).  Eventually, after substantial divestiture to 
pay down the debt, the corporation collapsed, and Federated/Allied filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection 
in January 1990.  The poor state of the sector was compounded by the failed leveraged buy-out of R. H. Macy 
for $3.5 billion in 1986, which ended in Chapter 11 protection in 1992.  Indeed, before the buyout, the business 
had $1.48 billion in shareholder equity ($1 of debt for every $11 in equity), after the takeover, the ratio was 
$3.15 billion in debt and $290 million in equity (or $10 in debt for each dollar of equity) (see Lehmann-Haupt, 
1996; Serwer, 1996; Trachtenberg, 1996).  This portfolio restructuring was driven more by the theory of 
financial restructuring where the pressure of high interest debt payments would force managers to focus on the 
core business, and not squander cash flows in presumably less rewarding diversification projects (see Bethel and 
Liebeskind, 1993, p10; Bowman and Singh, 1993; Jensen, 1986; 1989).  However, the department store industry 
proved to have too cyclical a cash flow for successful leveraging, especially at the levels owed.  Furthermore, 
the luxury-oriented nature of many of the more upscale department stores was in direct opposition to the 
pressure to aggressively cut operating margins.  This experience can be contrasted with numerous successful 
leveraged buy-outs in the supermarket industry which were characterised by non-cyclical cash flow (cf. Denis, 
1994; Wrigley, 1999a; 1999b). 
 
  
 
Strategic Acquisition-Based Portfolio Restructuring 
 
Since the late 1980s, there has been a movement away from holding a diversified conglomerate of separate 
retail businesses and a focus on acquisition based portfolio restructuring throughout the department store 
industry, concentrated on acquiring rival department store operators rather than retailers in other sectors (Table 
1).  This de-conglomeration trend has been characteristic of US industry more widely, as ‘divestitures of 
segments of the firm now deemed peripheral to the company’s core operations are motivated by...a systematic 
strategic analysis that there are weak (or no) synergies among broadly diversified activities’ (Harrison, 1997, 
p40; see also Prahalad and Hamel, 1990).  Michael Porter (1987) provides justification for this by suggesting 
that diversification is only effective when there is the opportunity to share resources and transfer skills across 
the portfolio of businesses (see also Chang and Singh, 1999).  This is difficult across such diverse segments as 
department stores and supermarkets, and, to a less extent, discounters.  Unlike the 1960s and 1970s, department 
store firms no longer attempted to construct a broad array of retailing operations across a conglomerate 
portfolio, but instead pursue strategic acquisitions59.  As the Director of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
has acknowledged: 
 
What is remarkable about this merger trend, in addition to its sheer volume, is also the nature of the 
acquisitions. In the 1980s, many mergers were prompted by financial market considerations. To a far greater 
extent, today's mergers appear to be motivated by strategic considerations (Baer, 1997, my emphasis). 
 
Explaining the Acquisition-Based Restructuring of the 1990s 
In the same way as the easy finance from high yield corporate bonds and private pension fund investment freed 
from its regulatory constraints (see Clark, 1993a; Wrigley, 1999b) paved the way for the great wave of financial 
re-engineering of US industries during the 1980s, so there are general, and industry specific, factors 
underpinning the mid-late 1990s merger wave in the department store sector.  Fundamentally, there was 
negative net growth in the industry.  Over three decades, conventional department stores lost market share to 
discount stores such as K-Mart and Wal*Mart (Figure 1), and speciality store such as Limited and Gap (Porter, 
1999; Rachman and Fabes, 1992; Rousey and Morganosky, 1996).  Therefore, although consolidation increased 
the individual market shares of retailers within the industry, this took place within a sector that has been 
declining in real terms.  For example, whilst Federated Department Stores increased its share of conventional 
department store sales from 14.8% of industry sales in 1989 to 28.8% in 1999, its share of GAF (general 
merchandise, furniture and apparel sales) has declined from 2.1% to 1.8% (see Table 2).  Table 3, for example, 
contrasts the slow growth of conventional department stores with the spiralling success of discount stores 
through the 1990s, as the latter ate their way into the traditional apparel heartland of the conventional 
department store.  Squeezed between alternative retail formats, department stores were forced, in effect, to 
consider acquiring their competitors to maintain their market position (Dunne and Kahn, 1997).  Within this 
hostile environment, many regionally based department store chains in the US were prepared to accept 
consolidation with sympathetic, larger operators to save themselves from insolvency. 
 
The restructuring period of the mid-late 1980s principally involved the national operators who acquired, and 
integrated, the large multiregionally and regionally dominant chains with attractive locations and strong market 
shares in major metropolitan markets.  By the early 1990s, however, there were few remaining large department 
store operators left to be acquired, although there remained a fragmented smaller regional industry of small 
chains, both publicly and privately owned across the country, previously too insignificant to attract larger 
players.  Firms such as Alabama based Proffitt’s began to exploit this niche, in turn creating a second wave of 
consolidation in the industry (see Table 1).   
 
For this second wave of acquisition based restructuring to be successful, the department store firms had to 
leverage their increased market power in two fundamental ways. First, capital concentration allowed the leading 
department stores to realise considerable cost savings through economies of scale by demanding discounts 
through large scale purchasing (cf. Stern and Weitz, 1997). This is now a necessity in the conventional 
department store sector, as acknowledged by Michael Gould, Chairman of Bloomingdale's: 
 
If you are a stand alone business today in the department store world then you are a $1 billion business then – 
what do you mean – what do you stand for?  Let’s say you are a $1 billion chain store in Pennsylvania – what’s 
their power when they go into the marketplace…they go to Tommy Hilfiger or they go to Nautica – what’s their 
power when they are up against $16 billion Federated or $14 billion May Company?  Awful difficult!  Better 
figure you are going to win on something unique, but I don’t think they are big enough to win on service 
(Interview 16). 
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 The exception to this rule has been the Target Corporation (formally Dayton Hudson Corp.) which has 
successfully built up a thriving discount business alongside their three department store operations. 
  
 
Second, the new portfolio of department store chains had to be organisationally restructured to eliminate 
duplication of core back office functions, centralising those operations the customer not see (Wood, 2001).  
These cost savings increase when operational expertise passes throughout the new firm in a process known as 
‘knowledge transfer’ (see Merrill Lynch, 1999a). The difficulty of this reorganisation should not be 
underestimated - a recent study by KPMG found that 83% of mergers were unsuccessful in producing any 
business benefit as regards shareholder value (KPMG, 1999). 
 
It is in this rapidly consolidating environment that the conventional department stores found themselves during 
the 1990s.  Such portfolio restructuring did not occur however in an aspatial or unregulated environment.  
Instead, it had to operate within the boundaries set by the Federal Trade Commission, in addition to those set by 
the competitive restraints of the market.  For Gordon Clark, ‘real regulation’ of this type must be understood as 
‘derived through the interplay between economics and political culture and then mediated through institutional 
practices’ (Clark, 1992a, p 622).  It is consequently necessary to understand these embedded regulatory 
conditions before analysing the strategic execution of merger activity in the sector and prescribing future 
solutions. 
 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF US ANTITRUST REGULATION AND ITS IMPACT ON THE RETAIL 
INDUSTRY 
 
US competition regulation has been a contested issue since the late 19th Century.  There was an awareness of the 
virtues of economic competition in industry - it limited excessive concentration of power, dispersing benefits 
broadly along the contours of the market.  It also provided a mechanism for the upward mobility for new market 
entrants to challenge the primacy of old competitors (Wood and Anderson, 1993, p1).  However, it was also 
appreciated that: 
 
Free from outside interference, competitors often collude or resort to unfair practices to restrict competition.  
They may erect barriers to market entry to preserve their position.  They may also seek a large market share in 
order to suppress the operation of market pricing mechanisms.  Thus, competition does not maintain itself.  
Government action often becomes necessary to preserve or restore economic competition (Wood and Anderson, 
1993, p3) 
 
Hence there was a need for the state to interfere with the working of the market mechanism to produce 
outcomes as near as possible to those demanded by neo-classical economics.  The difficulty came in what form 
this action took, and how laws and statutes could be drafted to accommodate the smooth operation of the 
economy and ensure competitive industries.   
 
At the heart of the US antitrust legislation is the Sherman Act passed in 1890, as a reaction against the 
predominant cartelisation and centralisation of market power prevailing in the United States at the end of the 
19th Century.  The act consisted of two main sections.  The first, prohibited all contracts, combinations, and 
conspiracies in restraint of trade, whilst the second, prohibited monopolisation and attempts to monopolise (see 
Audretsch, 1989).  The inability of the Sherman Act to control merger activity, however, was evident in the 
great merger wave that occurred at the turn of the century (Audretsch, 1989).  Indeed, the Sherman Act was not 
drafted expressly to deal with mergers.  As Valentine (1996) suggests, the act was successful in eliminating 
trusts and holding companies as vehicles for cooperation among companies although ‘the Supreme Court did 
not extend its reach to mergers unless it could be shown that their very purpose was to restrain trade.  Not 
surprisingly, businesses and barons adapted their technique and the US saw its first great merger wave in the 
1890s, after and perhaps because of the Sherman Act’ (Valentine, 1996).  The Clayton Act was consequently 
passed in 1914 to clarify and supplement the Sherman Act.  It attempted to solve the difficulty inherent in the 
19th Century legislation, which applied only to mergers when the merging firms were on the verge of attaining 
substantial monopoly power.  The revised Section 7, the part of the Clayton Act relevant to mergers, thus read: 
 
That no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or part of the stock or 
other share capital of another corporation engaged also in commerce where the effect of such an acquisition may 
be to substantially lessen competition between [the two firms] or to restrain such commerce in any section or 
community or tend to create a monopoly of any line of commerce (cited in Viscusi et al., 1995, p197, my 
emphasis). 
 
This represented a notable shift in emphasis, with Congress coming down on the side of interventionist policy.  
It did not require proof that an acquisition definitely would lessen competition substantially, but only a 
  
 
reasonable probability that it would (Valentine, 1996).  A second wave of mergers took place between 1916 and 
1929.  As Viscusi et al. (1995) suggest, because monopolistic mergers were effectively eliminated, there was a 
move towards the creation of oligopolies.  This trend was truncated by the Great Depression of the 1930s, but 
was followed by a third merger wave after the Second World War (Viscusi et al., 1995).  There was yet again a 
legislative response to the consolidations.  In 1950, the Celler-Kefauver Act was passed.  This revision of 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act explicitly prohibited the acquisition of another firm’s physical assets if the effect 
was to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly (Shugart, 1998).  In the process it finally 
closed a loophole inherent in the Clayton Act, which prevented it from applying either expressly, or by judicial 
construction, to the acquisition of assets or to vertical or conglomerate mergers - hence the law could easily be 
circumvented through the acquisition of a firm’s assets instead of its stock (see Audretsch, 1989; Luckansky and 
Gerber, 1993; Valentine, 1996).  The Celler Kaufaver revision further armed the FTC to take action, as the 
‘emphasis on the concepts of “substantial lessening of competition” and “tendency to create monopoly” 
demonstrated Congressional concern at preventing mergers that might lead to monopoly power at some time in 
the future’ (Audretsch, 1989, p41). 
 
During this post-war period, a structure-conduct-performance (SCP) framework was adopted by the FTC when 
analysing the threat of anti-competitive conditions (Eisner and Meier, 1990; Kay, 1991; Williamson, 1987).  
This framework suggested that industrial structure had a direct impact on the conduct of constituent firms.  As 
such, in concentrated industries, with barriers to entry, major firms possessed the capacity to form and maintain 
collusive arrangements through adoption of a range of pricing, output and promotional policies ensuring 
supracompetitive profits.  Such a structural approach to policy accepted the causal link between structure, 
conduct and performance, with action based on the premise that if the state corrected market structure, market 
conduct and performance would look after themselves (George and Jacquemin, 1992).  This prompted the FTC 
to make decisions based on simple statistical measurements, easing decision-making, where clear-cut rules were 
troublesome to establish. Levels of concentration in industries and sectors were therefore the means by which 
the FTC acted.   
 
Because concentration was casually related to the existence and abuse of market power, an arithmetic 
representation of market structure (e.g. market concentration figures) could identify probable violations and 
define the limits of legality.  Undoubtedly, the acceptance of the framework was also tied to popularist 
implications.  Through its focus on concentrated economic power, its assumption that this power prompted 
abusive forms of conduct, and its reaffirmation of open markets with multiple small actors, it provided technical 
justifications for...anti-big business goals (Eisner and Meier, 1990, p272). 
 
Eisner and Meier suggest that the most striking display of Congress’s adherence to the structure-conduct-
performance framework came in the late 1960s, when national deconcentration programmes were considered.  
Such initiatives would have compelled major firms in concentrated industries to divest substantial parts of their 
holdings to achieve certain given concentration levels. 
 
From National Concentration to Local Analysis of Horizontal Market Overlap 
 
The more systematic analysis of merger activity due to the structure-conduct-performance interpretation of the 
Celler-Kefauver Act is clearly evident during the post-war period with considerable implications for the analysis 
of mergers in the retail industry.  The landmark ruling on the Brown Shoe case of 1962 was particularly 
important  In this case, the Brown Shoe Company’s acquisition of G.R. Kinney was declared unlawful as a 
result of competition being impaired in 270 cities or submarkets where both Brown and Kinney operated retail 
shoe outlets – despite the fact that merger would have created a shoe retailer with a mere 2% national market 
share (Shugart, 1998).  This was due to a revised interpretation of market structure being adopted by the FTC.  
Crucially, instead of identifying national concentration levels, a new approach of identifying local market 
concentrations when investigating mergers was adopted.  This method of analysis was then reinforced as a result 
of a ruling in 1966 on the proposed Von Grocery Company - Shopping Bag merger (Wrigley, 1992; 1997).  In 
this instance, the Supreme Court refused the merger of two grocery chains holding a combined share of just 
7.5% of the grocery market in Los Angeles (Valentine, 1996).  The justification for this refusal was because; 
 
mergers involving small combined market shares were prohibited by Section 7 when they involved the leading 
seller in a market experiencing a trend towards centralisation (Mueller and Patterson, 1986, p386; cited by 
Wrigley, 1992, p739). 
 
  
 
It was clear that the FTC had changed its spatial scales of analysis60.  Indeed, Clinton-administration FTC 
Chairman, Robert Pitofsky cites the conclusions of the Brown Shoe case as continuing to set the precedent 
today: 
 
…if two retailers, one operating primarily in the eastern half of the Nation, and the other operating in the West, 
competed in but two mid-Western cities, the fact that the latter outlets represented but a small share of each 
company's business would not immunize the merger in those markets in which competition might be adversely 
affected (cited by Pitofsky, 2000). 
 
As a result of Celler-Kefauver, the 1960s saw the forestalling of a number of mergers in the department store 
industry.  Often this took the form of a ban on horizontal mergers for 10-15 years following the horizontal 
acquisition of another department store chain.  The effect was to push department stores to acquire retailers 
outside of their expert market segments through the purchase of discounters and speciality stores.  Alternatively, 
if an FTC enforcement banned any acquisition, the focus shifted to organic expansion in greenfield localities 
and thus the establishment of branches (Laulajainen, 1987, see Table 4).  As suggested more generally, an 
‘unintended consequence of the (Celler-Kefauver) act was to encourage firms to merge into…unrelated 
industries.  Indeed, the law made it attractive to choose merger candidates that were quite distant’ (Fligstein, 
1990, p222). 
 
During this period of regulatory tightening, dissenting voices originated from academics at the University of 
Chicago, who were advocates of a reduction in antitrust action.  Especially during the 1970s, the ‘Chicago 
School’ was instrumental in making the case for a movement away from merger guidelines focused on market 
structure analysis toward a greater emphasis on the procompetitive effects of mergers (Eisner and Meier, 1990; 
Wrigley, 1992).  The argument mounted was that the burden of proof should come from the regulator when 
arguing for market intervention (Fligstein, 1990; Wood and Anderson, 1993). 
 
Weakening of Enforcement and 1980s Financial Re-Engineering 
 
Chicago School views were used during the early years of the Reagan administration to support deregulation 
and monetarist policies of economic development (Oesterle, 1997; Wrigley, 1992).  This period was 
subsequently characterised by a relaxation in antitrust enforcement which reverted to a goal of preventing 
mergers that may enhance or create market power or facilitate its exercise - away from a decision based 
exclusively on concentration per se (Keyes, 1995; Valentine, 1996).  These regulatory conditions coincided with 
the rise of new financial instruments and markets, specifically the high-yield bond market, to partly provide the 
environment for the fourth merger wave in the 1980s, where the total value of transactions increased from $50 
billion in 1983 to over $200 billion in 1988 (Viscusi et al., 1995, p198, see also Taggart, 1988).  This decade 
was accordingly characterised by financial restructuring, during a period Clark refers to as the ‘arbitrage 
economy’ (Clark, 1989a, see also Baker and Smith, 1998; Bartlett, 2000; Hallsworth, 1991; Oesterdale, 1997). 
 
The ‘Fix-it First’ Regulatory Environment of the 1990s 
 
By the late 1980s, in response to mounting public and Congressional criticism of the FTC’s relaxed stance to 
retail mergers, there were signs of a retightening of antitrust enforcement (Wrigley, 1997).  In particular, the 
State of California challenged the food retail industry merger of American Stores and Lucky Stores, Inc. in 1988 
(Chevalier, 1995; Wrigley, 1997).  The challenge was successfully carried to the Supreme Court in 1991, and 
American Stores was forced to divest its entire 145 store Alpha Beta chain in California (Cotterill, 1999b, p4; 
Wrigley, 1997).  This was indicative of a new era of antitrust conditions for retail horizontal acquisitions during 
the 1990s, whereby the onus was on the acquirer to produce an acceptable strategic fit of acquisition to pre-empt 
any FTC action. 
 
The FTC, throughout the 1990s, essentially adopted a ‘fix-it-first’ approach, not necessarily opposing mergers 
in which the acquiring firm committed in advance (under the spirit of the Celler-Kefauver Act) to divest itself of 
horizontal market overlaps that might be deemed anti-competitive at the local level (Wrigley,1999b, p304).  
                                                 
60
 See Cotterill (1999b, p2; 1999c, p3) for recent comments on the importance of investigating local market 
effects. 
  
 
This approach was practical because the 1976 Hart Scott Rodeno Act compelled all proposed mergers of 
considerable size to be submitted to the FTC for consideration, allowing all mergers to be subject to the same 
level of investigation (Baer, 1996).  
 
The retail regulatory environment of the 1990s was, therefore, characterised by a two-component policy.  The 
first component of this was the FTC’s ‘fix it first’ policy – whereby the retailers had to divest horizontal market 
overlaps deemed to be anticompetitive at the local level in order to gain FTC approval of the merger.  This 
involved, as George Strachan of Goldman Sachs observed, the acquirer making ‘some strategic decisions 
regarding what the likely outcome of the FTC will be’.  In its turn ‘the acquirer probably makes an educated 
guess as to what the FTC is likely to demand and they try to accommodate the most obvious overlaps before the 
FTC orders them to do so.  It is probably built into their plan before the FTC has even announced it’ (Interview 
8). 
 
This anticipation of future enforcement through the ‘fix-it-first’ approach is echoed by Daniel Barry, equity 
analyst at Merrill Lynch: 
 
You think about the FTC and what they might do – you get the lawyers opinion – but you don’t talk to the FTC.  
After it’s done you go to the FTC.  The FTC has a certain number of days with which they have to issue an 
opinion so if they want to stop it or attempt to stop it then they have that many days to do it.  At that point they 
start negotiating and you may end up selling stores (Interview 6). 
 
Second, the merger had to be approved by the State Attorney General in the individual State in which it was 
occurring, even if clearance was granted by the FTC. Indeed the American – Lucky Stores divestiture was 
insisted on at the level of the Attorney General, as were the divestitures in Massachusetts and Connecticut in 
1995/6 in the case of the mergers of Stop & Shop and Purity Supreme and between Royal Ahold and Stop & 
Shop, even though the FTC had provisionally agreed the transactions61 (Wrigley, 1997).  As Professor David 
Rachman of Baruch College, New York suggested: 
 
Basically there is another level that nobody talks about, that even if the FTC approves mergers, here are these 
State Attorney Generals get involved with these things and sometimes they get nasty.  They fight.  I happen to 
be involved in one.  Some clerk in the main office of the Attorney General he said “they shouldn’t let them do 
that” and they put forward some stipulation and before you know it there is an uproar going on even though the 
FTC has approved the merger (Interview 21). 
 
This two-component policy was the regulatory framework that the US department store had to negotiate during 
the 1990s (see Figure 2).  The following case study serves to evoke the internalisation of the ‘fix-it-first’ 
approach demanded by the FTC, which department store retailers had to realise in their portfolio restructuring 
strategies.  In addition, it underlines how proposed acquisitions had to be negotiated and adjusted with, and 
between, other retailers in the surrounding area to result in an acceptable strategic fit.  The extent to which 
divestitures and store swaps were pre-emptive of those insisted on by the FTC and the individual State Attorney 
Generals, and how much they were due to creating an improved strategic fit, is unclear and will be discussed in 
the following sections. 
 
REGULATORY CONSTRAINED PORTFOLIO RESTRUCTURING IN ACTION - THE DILLARD’S 
– MERCANTILE STORES ACQUISITION  
 
On May 18th 1998, Dillard’s announced an agreement to acquire Mercantile Stores for $2.9 billion in cash.  
Under this agreement, Dillard’s, the 3rd largest conventional department store, with sales of over $6.5 billion in 
fiscal 1997, proposed to take, in one bite, the 7th largest chain, which had 1997 sales of over $3 billion across its 
106 department and home fashion stores under 13 different names in 17 states. 
 
Examining the Logic of the Deal 
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 This influence was most recently seen in September 1999, when the whole of the US retail industry waited to 
hear whether the Attorney General of California would ban all supercentre and warehouse club stores over 
100,000 square feet (see Merrill Lynch, 1999b; 1999c for assessments).  Although this was eventually vetoed, it 
showed the power of individual states in regulating their economic landscape hand-in-hand with the FTC. 
  
 
The proposed deal was completely contrary to Dillard’s previous strategy of paying bargain-basement prices for 
extremely small regional chains which did not attract the larger industry consolidators of Federated and May 
(see D. Smith, 1998 and Rosenberg, 1988).  In addition, there were considerable challenges and question marks 
concerning the strategic fit between Dillard’s and Mercantile.  Dillard’s had for 15 years adopted a policy of 
every day value pricing and did not promote merchandise excessively.  This was the opposite to the highly 
promotional Mercantile Stores.  In essence, the two department stores were at opposite ends of the value-luxury 
spectrum.  As Linda Kristiansen, Retail Analyst for Schroder’s Capital Management commented: 
 
I can’t think of two more opposite companies than Mercantile and Dillard’s in terms of their markdown 
philosophy so I think that this was a real problem for Dillard’s.  It was set up from the beginning to be a real 
disaster (Interview 14). 
 
A third major concern was the high price Dillard’s proposed to pay (see Table 5).  In essence the acquisition 
was highly defensive – Dillard’s was proposing to acquire Mercantile to avoid its competitors gaining leading 
market shares in markets in which Dillard’s was also present.  As an industry source commented: 
 
So basically Dillard deliberately overpaid for Mercantile and I think they did it as a defensive move because 
they (were) trying to keep Saks and Federated from taking…(these)… spots.  So even though they overpaid and 
they never get a good return on the investment, it might have been better for the shareholder in the long run, 
from a defensive standpoint, to have taken it over and go through all the problems they are going through than 
to let a competitor take those spots (Interview 6). 
 
Dillard’s – Mercantile and ‘Fix-it-First’ 
 
This case study displays how retailers learned in the 1990s to operate within the remit of the FTC ‘fix-it-first’ 
policy, thus avoiding any adverse regulatory enforcement by the FTC.  Second, it shows how the geography of 
portfolio restructuring can be reworked, whilst still in the merger negotiation stage, through divestitures and 
store swaps with competitors.  In particular, two events demonstrate the willingness of Dillard’s to take action 
ex-ante of regulatory enforcement (see Figure 3). 
 
a) The Belk exchange 
 
On July 19, 1998, Belk, the largest privately owned US department store, with coverage principally in the South 
Eastern United States, agreed to exchange with Dillard’s seven Mercantile Stores located in Florida and South 
Carolina, for nine Belk stores – eight located in Virginia and one in Tennessee (Dillard Press Release, July 14, 
1998).  This action made up half of the Dillard strategy to pre-empt any FTC antitrust action.  The transaction 
also produced a strategic fit appropriate for Belk as it gave them a strong first time presence in the Jacksonville, 
Florida market and enabled them to enter the Columbia, South Carolina market with three stores. 
 
For Dillard’s, the transaction represented an agreement that would avoid duplication of stores in certain 
geographical areas improving the strategic fit for the corporation.  It represented Dillard’s first entry into the 
Chattanooga, Tennessee and Wilmington and Hickory, North Carolina markets and increased its presence in the 
Richmond and Tidewater markets.  The Dillard CEO, Bill Dillard, hailed this as a win-win exchange:  “It’s rare 
that we can make the deal that so clearly benefits both parties.  When we add the Belk stores to our existing 
stores, we will be able for the first time to offer our Virginia customers a full assortment of Dillard’s 
merchandise in competitively sized stores.  Chattanooga is a long sought-after addition to our already strong 
Tennessee stores, and Hickory and Wilmington will enable us to continue our aggressive growth strategy in 
North Carolina.  On the other side of the coin, Jacksonville and Columbia fit naturally into Belk’s geographical 
strategy, and we welcome them into these markets”. 
 
A major factor that made the store swap so successful was the similar average square footage between Belk and 
Dillard’s and the same upper middle class target customer, indicative of an up-market conventional department 
store.  The strategy ensured that there would be minimal competition loss in specific spaces in the light of the 
transaction, appeasing the FTC, and producing a much-improved strategic fit for both retailers. 
 
b) Pre-emptive divestitures to Proffitt’s and May Company 
 
In August 1998, Dillard’s followed the coup of the Belk store swaps with the announcement that it was 
divesting some of the acquired Mercantile locations to Proffitt’s Inc. and May Company, again to pre-empt any 
FTC regulatory enforcement and improve the geography of the acquisition.  Under this agreement, Proffitt’s 
acquired 15 former Mercantile stores in several markets including Nashville, Tennessee and Orlando, Florida, 
whilst May Company, on the other hand, agreed to acquire 11 former Mercantile locations in markets which 
included Kansas City, Missouri and Colorado Springs, Colorado. Critically, the stores sold were located 
primarily in markets in which Dillard had a strong presence prior to the Mercantile acquisition, especially 
around Kansas City, Nashville and Orlando.  Such action prevented Dillard, therefore, from enjoying a localised 
  
 
monopoly in conventional department store retailing in the specific locales but equally ensured no 
cannibalisation of sales. 
 
The Federal Trade Commission and Defining the Department Store Industry 
 
Although Dillard's acquisition of Mercantile was of itself strategically questionable, the execution of the 
consolidation, provides an extremely interesting case study of a firm tailoring an acquisition to conform to the 
FTC’s ‘fix-it-first’ policy secondly, producing an improved strategic fit beyond that evident in the pre-merger 
geography.  The extent to which the store swaps and divestitures were pre-empting antitrust action or to what 
degree they were initiated to improve the deals’ overall strategic fit is not immediately obvious.  It is dependent 
on the perceptions of the firm regarding how the FTC might chose to interpret the boundaries of the 
conventional department store industry.   
 
As Shugart (1998) recently noted, narrowly drawn market boundaries, which only include a few retailers, 
increase the probability that a proposed merger between any two sellers in that market will be challenged.  
Conversely, if the market definition is more broadly defined, the greater number of competitors dilutes the 
impact of any merger on their reported market shares.  There are two perspectives the FTC could have adopted 
in this case.  First, it could have viewed the conventional department store sector as an industry of itself.  Such 
an interpretation would have suggested a highly concentrated market, and the need for antitrust action.  Table 2 
for example suggests that, in 1999 Dillard’s possessed nearly 16% of the total industry.  However, as previously 
noted, the conventional department store sector had faced vigorous competition during the 1980s and 1990s and 
seen substantial sales decline in the face of discount and speciality stores, driving consolidation in the sector.  
This suggests that a broader definition of the market for conventional department stores is more appropriate 
given a situation where, as Terry Lundgren, President of Federated Department Stores, acknowledged 
‘(c)ompetition used to be defined more directly as department store versus department store.  Today it is 
department store versus everyone’ (Interview 23).  That broader conception of the market comes in the form of 
the GAF (General merchandise, furniture and apparel sales) statistic of what, in 1999, Dillard’s accounted for 
only 1.1% (Table 2). 
 
There is considerable evidence to suggest that FTC prudently adopted the GAF approach rather than the 
conventional department store definition of the market in its consideration of mergers in the industry in the 
1990s.  Perhaps the best evidence of this comes from two acquisitions undertaken by a post-bankruptcy 
Federated.  In 1994, Federated acquired Macy’s, giving it a significant increase in the number of stores in New 
York, the south-east, and a major breakthrough on the west coast.  The Macy acquisition was quickly followed 
by the purchase of the troubled Broadway Stores, also a west coast, Californian operator in 1995.  As a result, 
and as evident from Figure 4, there was considerable market overlap in California, yet the reaction of the FTC 
was muted.  As Vice President of Federated Department Stores, Carol Sanger noted in terms of FTC – required 
divestitures: 
 
With the Macy's there was none.  None that was FTC …..In California it was a different story because …. we 
were there with Macy's, and then with Broadway, the question was for the FTC, who was our competition?  And 
there were some in the FTC who wanted to say that only department stores - we only competed against 
department stores.  Well that's ludicrous, we compete against anybody who sells anything.  And by the broader 
definition of competitor, Wal*Mart's our competitor, K-Mart's our competitor, Penney's and Sears are our 
competitors so our definition of who our competitors are was key in that whole decision and ultimately the 
decision was that all retail is the marketplace that you have to look at.  You can't say that we only compete 
against May Company, we compete against Sears, Penney's and Limited and Gap and we compete against 
speciality stores and shoe stores….We had to divest ourselves of four I think! (Interview 3) 
 
In this light, it is clear that the Dillard's - Mercantile pre-merger adjustments during the Summer of 1998 were 
driven as much by strategic market fit considerations as they were by the ‘fix-it-first’ policy of the FTC, given 
the likely use of the GAF figure by the FTC to interpret industry boundaries.  It was this dual motivation of ‘fix-
it-first’ and strategic market fit that drove pre-merger divestitures and store swaps. 
 
Throughout the 1990s the ‘fix it first’ approach has represented the understood policy of the FTC in which 
retailers have understood their responsibilities and acted accordingly.  Recent developments from two proposed 
consolidations however signal a harsher reading by the FTC of merger policy and a divergence away from this 
status quo.  This has vast implications for the outcomes of portfolio restructuring in the conventional department 
store sector in particular and the US retail industry more generally. 
 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTITRUST INTERPRETATION: A NEW PARADIGM OF FTC 
ENFORCEMENT? 
 
  
 
Recent developments in US retail industry regulation have cast doubt over the continuing implementation of the 
‘fix-it-first’ approach in dealing with horizontal market overlaps.  It is widely believed that precedents have 
been set by the FTC’s response in recent cases; the first dealing with the definition of markets, and the second, 
with divestiture as a policy for ensuring local competitiveness. 
 
Defining Markets: The Staples – Office Depot Precedent 
 
The first case relates to the proposed merger in 1997 between the first and second largest US office superstore 
chains; Staples and Office Depot.  Staples offered to divest itself of its horizontal market overlaps, yet the case 
was taken to court and effectively killed off when, in June 1997, the federal district court in Washington, DC 
granted the FTC’s request for a preliminary injunction blocking the merger (Baker, 1997). 
 
The rationale for the refusal, according to the FTC, was that they had evidence that Staples raised prices and 
was thus uncompetitive in areas where it was the only office superstore in town.  Such assumptions relied on 
complex econometric calculations of past experience (see Baker 1997; 1999).  The case however, had far 
broader connotations for the rest of the retail industry and represented an important change in practice by the 
antitrust authorities.  Office superstores, in this instance, were essentially being regarded by the FTC as a 
separate retail category independent of all other forms of retail (Warren-Boulton and Dalkir, 1997, see also 
Dalkir and Warren-Boulton, 1998; Werden, 2000).  However, as Shugart (1998) notes, had the market included 
sales of office products at independent, mail order and discount retailers, then the Staples and Office Depot’s 
combined market share would have represented a mere 5%. 
 
The case was indicative of a much stricter interpretation of industry boundaries by the FTC.  Instead of the 
market being defined by all sales of the product, it is defined on the basis of the retail format.  This is the exact 
opposite to what has traditionally occurred with the ‘fix-it-first’ policy in the department store industry 
throughout the 1990s. 
 
Ineffective Divestiture: The Ahold – Pathmark Precedent 
 
The second case relates to the FTC’s harsh stance in late 1999 on the proposed merger between Royal Ahold, 
the 4th largest food retailer in the US and leading operator in the Boston and Washington DC corridor, and 
Pathmark (a subsidiary of Supermarkets General Holding Corporation), the market leader in the metropolitan 
areas of New York and New Jersey (Wrigley, 2001).  Ahold had previously made a large number of successful 
acquisitions in the US and divested enough stores under the ‘fix it first’ approach to appease the FTC (see 
Wrigley, 1998; 1999a; 1999b).  However, as Cotterill (1999a) suggests, such divestitures had often been 
ineffectual in terms of maintaining local market competitiveness.  In an analysis of the performance of divested 
stores from Ahold’s previous acquisition of Stop & Shop in 1996, Cotterill suggests that ‘the stores divested 
have suffered major sales declines, but that the stores retained by the Royal Ahold have made major gains’ 
(Cotterill, 1999a, p9, see also Cotterill et al., 1999).  In effect, it seems that retailers such as Ahold had been 
able to ‘cherry pick’ stores for divestiture, thereby divesting the least desirable store in each location (Cotterill, 
1999a, p9).  In addition, Cotterill suggests that merging firms should not be allowed to divest to weak 
competitors from whom they can rapidly recapture market share.  In short he suggests that the ‘fix-it-first’ 
approach in the food retail industry has produced divestiture orders that have not protected consumers from 
increased concentration and the exercise of market power (Cotterill, 1999a, p9).  The FTC accepted such 
evidence, and effectively blocked the Pathmark acquisition.  Ahold consequently walked away from the deal, 
citing a significant change in policy by the FTC.  Indeed, as Wrigley (2001) suggests, by mid 2000 there was 
mounting evidence of the tougher enforcement, as first the FTC decided to seek an injunction against the 
acquisition of 74 Winn-Dixie grocery stores in Texas by leading US grocery retailer, Kroger, citing its likely 
effect on prices and consumer welfare (see also Guidera, 2000) and, second, as it forced the 6th largest US food 
retailer, Delhaize America, to divest or close the entire southeast division of its Hannaford Brothers acquisition 
to gain regulatory approval (Wall Street Journal, 2000; Wrigley, 2001). 
 
Interpreting the Evidence 
 
There are two issues raised by these recent cases of FTC enforcement that have implications for future portfolio 
restructuring in the retail industry.  First there is evidence that the method of defining markets and industry 
segments is becoming more restrictive.  Second there is evidence of a significant shift in the ‘fix-it-first’ 
approach - no longer being enough to divest horizontal market overlaps to pre-empt FTC enforcement.  Instead 
it is suggested by Cotterill (1999d) that divestiture is not a permanent prophylactic for market power.  The FTC 
apparently agrees with this and has now shifted the bar towards tougher enforcement.  ‘It now seems to require 
more than a static divestiture that provides “numerical” parity to a competitive norm at the divestiture date.  The 
momentum of the acquirer that will continue and may well increase after a merger is now factored in and this 
momentum factor requires a more substantial divestiture or outright challenge’ (Cotterill, 1999d).  Numerous 
statements coming from the FTC have supported this opinion. 
 
  
 
On the subject of defining markets, literature from the FTC indicates the adoption of a more active and 
malleable view of market boundaries.  As FTC Director William Baer suggests, the emphasis has moved from 
market definition, toward analysing market interaction: 
 
But the fact that we take a hard look at the actual competitive interactions within a market, rather than 
considering our job done as soon as the market is defined, should not be a basis for criticism but a reflection of 
the fact that we are doing our job. When we find unique relationships among products made by the merging 
firms, as evidenced by how the firms behave in the marketplace and by quantitative analysis of past pricing 
behavior, we have a merger that poses problems. And the issue of the precise market definition becomes and 
should become secondary (Baer, 1997). 
 
This active definition and subsequent reaction is reinforced by comments by FTC Chairman, Robert Pitofsky 
(2000), who suggests that consideration will be given to whether the merger is part of a greater merger wave, 
rather than viewing the case in isolation.   
 
On the subject of divestitures, it is clear there are considerable developments.  Pitofsky (2000) recently 
suggested that considerable problems are likely to remain even if all horizontal market overlaps are eliminated.  
Indeed, the issue of the quality of the divestitures has been central to recent FTC concerns.  Baer (1996; 1997) 
suggests that in future there will be moves to speed the divestiture process if it is necessary.  Secondly, Baer 
(1996) advocates the increased the use of what he describes as the enforcement of crown jewel divestitures, 
where the Commission prescribe the divestiture of specified holdings.  He acknowledges that in numerous 
cases, divestitures have been ineffectual, as acquirers have ‘been able to frustrate the viability of a 
divestiture….by not transferring all the necessary technology or know-how’ (Baer, 1996).  As Pitofsky (2000) 
has suggested ‘the bottom line is the divestiture must be effective and consumer welfare should not be asked to 
bear an unreasonably high risk that accomplished an uncertain and questionable undertaking’.  Frequently, this 
has not been the case with the ‘fix-it-first’ approach as  ‘history has now shown that the antitrust authorities 
overwhelming preference for a ‘fix-it-first’ conciliatory approach to mergers in an industry has produced a 
series of ineffectual divestitures that have rationalized the positions of leading chains, often enabling them to 
expand market share in the post merger period, thereby resulting in increased rather than lower concentration’ 
(Cotterill, 1999a, p2). 
 
It is uncertain as to whether the stricter enforcement and narrowing of market definition by the FTC will be 
carried through into rulings on portfolio restructuring in the department store industry.  It is suggested that food 
retailing represents more of a political arena for state intervention, and that department store retailing operates in 
much more of a backwater.  Indeed, an Ernst & Young analyst suggested, ‘(t)hey (the FTC) are not as sensitive 
as they are in apparel as they are in food.  Food is a very sensitive thing, much more sensitive than apparel is….I 
don’t know, they blow hot and cold.  It just depends on the political – it is all very political of course’ (Interview 
18).   There is certainly a convincing argument that the FTC is likely to retain the working definition of the 
competitive market for the conventional department store industry in terms of GAF as 
 
This industry needs all the help it can get frankly.  They are not dominating anything and certainly not in a 
position to name prices (Interview 8). 
 
As one prominent department store CEO suggests, even high market concentrations in the conventional 
department store industry do not represent dominant market power beyond the tolerance of the FTC: 
 
I think what the FTC has historically done is smart and appropriate and that is they have looked at retail as a 
broader issue than just department stores.  Our competitor for our business is not just another department store.  
Department stores in the aggregate…in a typical market, department stores may in the aggregate have 25% of 
the general merchandise, apparel & furniture – the GAF figure, so clearly 75% of the competition is not 
department stores.  It is other forms of retail.  So the FTC appropriately has looked at these from that 
perspective and concluded that even after the merger of the two companies that the share market they have is 
not counter to the beliefs of the FTC (Interview 12). 
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE DEPARTMENT STORE CONSOLIDATION 
 
Until the end of the 1990s, under the prevailing ethos of the FTC’s ‘fix-it-first’ approach, US retailers accepted 
that they would have to divest a given number of stores in order to conclude mergers and acquisitions.  
Essentially, this represented to them, what Clark and Wrigley (1995) would regard as a sunk cost to barrier to 
entry in a given market area62.  The recent hardening of the FTC stance may surpass a threshold of tolerance for 
these sunk costs and lead to a possible decline in horizontal mergers in the retail industry.  Certainly for Royal 
                                                 
62
 A sunk cost is regarded as those costs to the firm which are irrevocably committed to a particular use, and 
therefore not recoverable in the case of exit (Clark and Wrigley, 1995, p 205). 
  
 
Ahold the threshold was exceeded and they walked away.  However, within the department store industry the 
number of potential acquisitions has declined, as few regional chains are left.  Consequently, as in the case of 
food retailing, the small number of acquisition candidates for department store acquirers ‘effectively places a 
premium on chains that can offer to strategic buyers limited risk of extensive FTC-required divestment of stores.  
But conversely, because of the pre-existing geographies of major firms seeking to grow by acquisition and the 
regulatory risks of market overlap, such targets have, in practice, a strictly limited number of potential partners’ 
(Wrigley, 1999b, p304).  These potential partners are, by virtue of the considerable acquisition activity, clearly 
large entities.  Consequently any merger will inevitably involve considerable market overlap.  This would 
undoubtedly lead to a situation whereby any acquisition would undoubtedly trigger FTC action, with possible 
refusal through litigation.   The only solution for such a situation would be for the leading department stores to 
adopt a strategy of joint acquisitions, effectively sharing the target in their unpenetrated markets where antitrust 
enforcement would not apply.  This could possibly lead to another era of portfolio restructuring where the large 
department stores firms are once again broken up and shared out.  Conversely, the tightened regulatory 
environment could serve to stabilise the industry, as emphasis turns of organisational restructuring of the 
existing store portfolios. 
 
However, what must now be factored into the picture is the arrival of the Bush Administration in early 2001 and 
the expectation of looser antitrust scrutiny under a Republican appointed FTC Chairman.  As the New York 
Times commented, ‘most policy makers and corporate chiefs expect a loosening of antitrust policy. Economic 
advisers to President-elect George W. Bush have been critical of the Clinton administration for being too 
aggressive, particularly in its pursuit of monopolists’ (Labaton, 2001, p 3).  Clearly, the direction of antitrust 
policy remains a controversial and contested area of US economic and political concern. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has illustrated, through the example of the US department store industry, the role of the regulatory 
state in portfolio restructuring.  As Laulajainen suggested, over a decade ago, ‘(i)t is not just the willingness of 
the target to get acquired or the aggressor’s capacity to place a hostile bid.  It is as much a question of the FTC’s 
attitude to the deal, which, in turn, is dependent on the political climate in general’ (Laulajainen, 1987, p170).  It 
is evident that the investment decisions by firms do not occur in a regulatory vacuum and instead regulation 
does, to an extent, dictate investment decisions (cf. Christopherson, 1993; 1999).  The difficulty comes in 
interpreting state rules and, more broadly, theorising what role the state should have. 
What is clearly the issue, however, is the extent to which the state (at all levels) ought to have the size, roles, 
and functions that it currently has, given competing normative claims regarding the proper role of the state in 
relation to the market (Clark, 1992a, p615). 
 
In addition, it is clear that market consequences cannot be read off investment rules.  As Clark (1990) suggests, 
it is only in specific market contexts that the meaning of rules is determined and defined.  Whilst the rules 
themselves may not change, the consideration and theorising of them may.  Indeed, ‘interpretations of rules and 
procedures are always vulnerable to changing circumstances and competing arguments about the significance of 
changing circumstances for the integrity of the rules; how those circumstances are accommodated within the 
institutional context is an issue of considerable dispute’ (Clark, 1992a, p620).  As such, ‘rules of adjudication 
are often unstable and fragmented.  Reality as the unidimensional empirical facts of legal positivism is an 
implausible reference point for determining the plausibility of competing interpretations, and interpretations are 
political acts – contested over as representations of political interests’ (Clark, 1989b, p217).  There must not be 
confusion over the substantive content of regulation and the result of the legal-regulatory process (see Clark, 
1992b, p721).  Indeed, ‘(a)lthough the process of corporate restructuring in retailing is clearly contingent upon 
the legislation which governs competition in the industry, corporate restructuring and its spatial expression, in 
turn, transform that regulatory environment’ (Wrigley, 1992, p748).  This leads one to a less rigid dichotomy 
between regulation as economic imperative and regulation as social practice - as Marden (1992) suggests, very 
much a false dichotomy as laws and regulations are continually re-interpreted and reviewed as conditions and 
political ideologies mutate over time (cf. Marsden and Wrigley, 1995; 1996; Marsden et al., 1998; 2000; 
Wrigley, 1993).  It is in this environment the retailer is challenged to undertake portfolio restructuring. 
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Table 1  Department Store Acquisitions of the 1990s. 
 
Date Acquirer Acquired (Geographical 
Area) 
Cost 
(If known) 
No of Stores 
(If known) 
1990 May Thalhimers, (Richmond, 
Va.), Sibley’s, (Rochester, 
N.Y.) 
N/D 26 
1990 Dayton Hudson Marshall Field (Midwest)  $1.4 billion N/D 
Oct 1992-July 
1993 
Proffitt’s Hess (Southeast) $24 million 18 
March 1994 Proffitt’s McRae’s (Southeast) £212 million 28 
1994 Bon-Ton Hess N/D 20  
1994 May 10 stores from Hess 
(Northeast) 
N/D 10 
 May 1994 Federated Joseph Horne Co. $116 million 10 
Dec 1994 Federated R. H. Macy $4.1 billion 123 
April 1994 Proffitt’s Parks-Belk Less than $20 million 3 
July 1995 May and J. C. 
Penney 
Woodward and Woodward 
& Lothrop stores 
Total Cost $460 million 21 
Aug 1995 Federated Broadway $1.6 billion 82 
April 1996 May 13 Strawbridge & Clothier 
stores (Philadelphia). 
$479.5 million 13 
Feb 1996 Proffitt’s Younker’s (Midwest) $258 million 51 
October 1996 Proffitt’s Parisian (Southwest and 
Midwest) 
$452 million 38 
Nov 1996 Belk Leggett Stores $92 million 31 
February 
1997 
Proffitt’s Herberger’s (Midwest and 
Great Plains) 
$154.9 million 40 
January 1998 Proffitt’s Carson Pirie Scott 
(Midwest) 
$956 million 55 
March 1998 Proffitt’s Broady’s (North Carolina) N/D 6 
May 1998 Dillard Mercantile $2.9 billion 
 
103 
August 1998 Gottschalks The Harris Company 
(California) 
$36.1 million 9 
Sept 1998 Proffitt’s Saks Holdings (National) $2.1 billion 96 
October 1999 May ZMCI (Utah, Idaho) $52 million 14 
 
Sources: various company reports and 10K’s submitted to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission. 
 
Strategic acquisition-based portfolio restructuring has set the pace for the 1990s department 
store industry.  This has seen large stores acquire regional chains leaving very few available for 
purchase in the 21st century.
  
 
Figure 1  A Comparison of the Performance of Conventional and Discount Department Stores, 1987-1999 
 
0
50000
100000
150000
200000
250000
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Year
$
 
M
i
l
l
i
o
n
s
Conventional Department Stores Discount Department Stores
 
Source: data from US Department of Commerce (2000) 
 
The conventional department store industry has gradually lost sales relative to the discount department stores (e.g. Target).  This 
environment of minimal net growth has provided an inducement to consolidate. 
  
 
Table 2  Major Department Store Retailers’ Share of GAF Throughout the 1990s 
 
 1989 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Personal 
consumption exp. 
$3,596.7 $4,716.4 $4,969.0 $5,237.5 $5,524.4 $5,848.6 $6,257.3 
GAF sales (billions) 454.3 592.6 625.0 655.2 685.5 729.2 783.5 
Department Store 
Sales (billions) 
51.2 51.1 51.0 51.7 53.1 53.7 55.1 
        
Federated 
Department Stores  
$7.6 $13.9 $15 $15.2 $15.7 $15.4 $15.9 
% of industry sales 14.8% 27.3% 29.5% 29.4% 29.5% 28.6% 28.8% 
% of GAF sales 2.1 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 
May Department 
Stores 
$9.5 $9.8 $10.6 $11.7 $12.4 $13.1 $13.9 
% of industry sales 18.5% 19.1% 20.8% 22.5% 23.3% 24.4% 25.2% 
% of GAF sales 2.1 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 
Dillard Department 
Stores 
$3.0 $5.5 $5.9 $6.2 $6.6 $7.8 $8.7 
% of industry sales 6.0% 10.8% 11.6% 12.0% 12.5% 14.5% 15.8% 
% of GAF sales 0.7 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 
Saks, Inc. $0.1 $0.6 $1.3 $1.9 $3.5 $6.0 $6.4 
% of industry sales 0.2% 1.2% 2.6% 3.7% 6.7% 11.1% 11.7% 
% of GAF sales 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.8 0.8 
FD/MA/DDS/SKS 
department stores 
$20.2 $29.9 $32.9 $35.0 $38.2 $42.2 $44.8 
% of industry sales 39.4% 58.4% 64.5% 67.7% 71.9% 78.7% 81.4% 
% of GAF sales 4.4 5.0 5.3 5.3 5.6 5.8 5.7 
Other department 
store operators 
$31.0 $21.3 $18.1 $16.7 $14.9 $11.4 $10.3 
% of industry sales 60.6% 41.6% 35.5% 32.3% 28.1% 21.3% 18.6% 
% of GAF sales 6.8 3.6 2.9 2.6 2.2 1.6 1.3 
 
NB: GAF – General merchandise, furniture and apparel sales 
Source: adapted from Goldman Sachs estimates, April 2000 
  
 
Table 3  Department Store Retailers v Discount Store Retailers’ Share of GAF in the 1990s 
 
 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Total Retail Sales $ billions (a) $1,844 $1,855 $1,951 $2,082 $2,248 $2,359 $2,502 $2,610 $2,729 $2,972 
GAF Sales $ billions (a) 471.6 485.4 519.2 553.0 594.2 624.4 655.0 683.2 724.8 778.7 
           
Department Store Sales $ billions 
(a) 
51.2 50.6 51.3 50.7 51.6 51.4 52.5 53.9 54.9 56.6 
% of GAF Sales 10.6% 10.4% 9.9% 9.2% 8.7% 8.2% 8.0% 7.9% 7.6% 7.3% 
           
Discount Store Sales N/D N/D N/D 122.0 146.1 161.9 171.9 187.4 205.0 N/D 
% of GAF Sales N/D N/D N/D 22.1% 24.6% 26.0% 26.2% 27.4% 28.3% N/D 
 
NB: GAF – General merchandise, furniture and apparel sales 
 
Sources: adapted from Goldman Sachs (1996; 1999) unless otherwise stated. 
(a) data from US Dept. of Commerce (2000). 
 
Table 4  Diversification of Major Department Store Chains in the 1960s and 1970s 
 
 
Corporation 
 
FTC ban 
 
Major entry into 
  Discount retailing Speciality retailing 
Allied 1965-1975 1961-1978 1979-early 1990s 
Associated 1975 (divestment) 1972-1976 1916- 
Macy’s None 1987- early 1990s None 
Federated 1965-1970 1968-early 1990s 1982-early 1990s 
May’s 1965-1975 1970-early 1990s 1979-early 1990s 
Dayton Hudson None 1962-present 1966-present 
CHH 1966-1974 None 1969-acquired 1987 
 
Source: adapted, with modifications from Laulajainen, 1987, p235.  Additional data from R. H. Macy, 1994 and various company reports. 
  
 
Figure 2 A Decision Flow For a Retail Horizontal Acquisition Under the FTC ‘fix-it-first’ Policy 
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Table 5  Dillard’s, Inc.’s Acquisition in Context 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) LTM – Last Twelve Months 
(b) EBITDA – Earnings Before Interest, Tax Deductions and Depreciation 
Source: adapted from Merrill Lynch (1998) and Paine Webber (1999) 
Acquirer Acquired Date Enterprise Value 
to LTM Revenue 
(a) 
Enterprise Value 
to LTM EBITDA 
(b) 
     
Proffitt’s McRae’s Mar-94 0.8x 6.0x 
Federated Macy Jul-94 0.7x 17.8x 
May & JC Penney Woodward Jul-95 0.9x 30.9x 
Federated Broadway Aug-95 0.8x 20.6x 
Proffitt’s Younkers Feb-96 0.5x 6.5x 
May Strawbridge Apr-96 0.5x 9.4x 
Proffitt’s Parisian Oct-96 0.7x 9.2x 
Proffitt’s Herberger’s Feb-97 0.6x 8.6x 
Proffitt’s Carson Jan-98 0.8x 9.2x 
Dillard Mercantile May-98 1.0x 10.3x 
    
Industry Average  0.73x 12.85 
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Figure 3  The Geography of the Dillard – Mercantile Stores Acquisition 
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Figure 4   The R. H. Macy and Broadway Stores Acquisitions By Federated Department Stores 
